Politics and Economics in the Eighties by Morris P. Fiorina
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Politics and Economics in the Eighties
Volume Author/Editor: Alberto Alesina and Geoffrey Carliner, editors
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-01280-8
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/ales91-1
Conference Date: May 14-15, 1990
Publication Date: January 1991
Chapter Title: Elections and the Economy in the 1980s: Short- and Long-Term
Effects
Chapter Author: Morris P. Fiorina
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c5413
Chapter pages in book: (p. 17 - 40)1  Elections and the Economy 
in the 1980s: Short- and 
Long-Term Effects 
Morris P. Fiorina 
In  1980 Ronald Reagan led the Republican party into the Promised Land. 
That the Reagan-Bush ticket carried 49 states was noteworthy enough, but the 
party also scored unanticipated victories in numerous Senate races, giving it 
control of that body for the first time since 1954, and a respectable gain of 33 
seats in the House of Representatives gave the president a “working conserv- 
ative majority” in that Democratic stronghold. All of this set off talk of a “turn 
to the right,” a “Reagan Revolution ,” and a(nother) new Republican majority. 
After the rhetoric cleared however, research pronounced a less sweeping ver- 
dict. The 1980 elections were just another example of the rejection of failed 
leadership. In particular, Americans found the Carter administration wanting 
in two major respects (Schneider 1981). First, there was national frustration 
with the course of  international affairs, especially with America’s apparent 
helplessness in the face of terrorism. Second, there was deep dissatisfaction 
with the course of economic affairs. A Democratic president with comfortable 
Democratic majorities in Congress had presided over a “stagflation” culminat- 
ing in double-digit inflation and interest rates combined with moderate unem- 
ployment and low growth. 
The succeeding elections of the 1980s confirmed the view that traditional, 
off-the-shelf explanations still applied. In  1982,  coming out of  the worst 
recession since the Great Depression, the Republicans lost 26 House seats. 
But with inflation crushed and the economy growing, Republican fortunes 
rebounded, and in 1984 Reagan enjoyed a sweeping reelection victory. To the 
surprise of many economists and the consternation of  many Democrats, the 
recovery continued, and in  1988 George Bush profited by  leading the Re- 
publican party to its third straight presidential victory and fifth out of  the 
past six. 
Moms Fiorina is professor of government at Harvard University. 
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Some commentators argue that the story of  the Reagan elections is little 
more than the story of the economy (Kiewiet and Rivers 1985). Others argue 
that the story is more complicated, but no one denies that the economy was a 
major element of the story. This paper briefly recounts that story. Part of it is 
as straightforward as these introductory sentences suggest: the economy had 
the expected effects on presidential approval, the presidential vote, and the 
distribution of  congressional seats. What political scientists refer to as the 
“short-term” effects of  the economy operated much as models and methods 
developed with data from the 1960s and 1970s predicted-low  inflation and 
rising incomes are political goods, while the opposites are “bads.” From this 
standpoint the 1980s simply gave us more observations and a bit more vari- 
ance. But the economy had a deeper, more subtle effect as well. During the 
1980s the balance of partisan affiliations shifted toward the Republicans. This 
shift involves what political scientists refer to as long-term effects, the basis 
of statements about the “majority party,” the “emerging Republican majority,” 
and the end of the “New Deal party system.” The two major sections of this 
paper describe the short- and long-term effects of the economy in the 1980s. 
In the next section I will survey the short-term effects. Then,  in the more 
original part of the paper, I will report some preliminary analyses that suggest 
deeper, more lasting effects that will be felt in elections yet to come. 
1.1  Economic Conditions, Public Opinion, and Voting 
In the past two decades few topics have received more scholarly attention 
that the relationship between economic conditions on the one hand and public 
opinion and voting on the other. First, political scientists attempted to match 
fluctuations in  economic time series with fluctuations in the congressional 
vote (Kramer 1971; Tufte 1975)  and presidential approval (Mueller 1970; Ker- 
nell 1978; Monroe 1978). Then, seeing easy pickings, economists improved 
on our methods and models (Fair 1978; Frey and Schneider 1978; Golden and 
Poterba  1980) and even  endogenized economic conditions themselves via 
models of the “political business cycle” (Nordhaus 1975).  The literature is too 
vast to even attempt to review here.2 I will simply survey its principal findings 
by taking a closer look at the electoral politics of the 1980s. 
1.1.2  Economic Conditions and Reagan Approval 
Studies of presidential approval have a standard design though they differ 
in numerous details. Gallup presidential approval figures (often quarterly av- 
erages) are regressed on measures of  economic conditions (typically varia- 
tions in unemployment, inflation, and real income), variables designed to cap- 
ture the effects of  wars (Korea, Wet Nam), dummy variables representing 
important events (Watergate, the Iranian hostage crisis), and  variables that 
capture changes in  presidential administrations. Analysts have reached  no 19  Elections and the Economy 
firm consensus about the lagged effects of  economic variables (Golden and 
Poterba 1980; Hibbs 1982; Norpoth 1985) and whether approval follows well- 
defined cycles or trends (Stimson  1976). Within administrations, however, 
recent economic conditions have clear and reasonably precise effects on pres- 
idential approval. 
Casual consumers of  1980s political commentary will be surprised by the 
thrust of research findings in this area. From the standpoint of approval mod- 
els, there was no “teflon” president, at least in the economic realm. When 
economic dirt hit, it stuck. The Reagan administration took harsh action to 
halt the inflation of the previous decade. As an economic result, the country 
entered into a serious recession. As a political result, Reagan’s approval fig- 
ures plummeted more than 30 points to a low of 35 percent (as a benchmark 
consider that Richard Nixon’s ratings bottomed out at 23 percent just before 
resigning). As the economy recovered Reagan’s approval ratings recovered 
with it. By the 1984 election he had gained 20 points. After careful analysis 
Kiewiet and Rivers conclude that “differences between Carter’s and Reagan’s 
levels of popularity are satisfactorily explained by the differences between the 
respective economic records and rally points of the two administrations. . . . 
Reagan’s popularity at reelection was almost solely a function of  the perform- 
ance of the economy after the 1982 midterm elections” (1985, 81-82). 
The most recent analyses using data extending to 1987 agree. The pattern 
of Reagan’s popularity-not  just one but two recoveries after declines-may 
have been unprecedented, but the underlying causes were not.) Ostrom and 
Simon (1989) make a heroic effort to augment the standard analyses with mea- 
sures of the Reaganauts’s purported flair for the dramatic-the  heart-tugging 
prime-time speech and the well-covered presidential trip. They conclude that 
such public relations efforts had little effect. When the economy faltered, Rea- 
gan’s approval figures weakened; when the economy gathered steam, Rea- 
gan’s figures perked up.4 He left office the most popular president since Eisen- 
hower because he left office with a strong economy. 
1.1.3 
The  frequency with  which  pollsters inquire  about  presidential approval 
makes time-series analysis a natural choice for students of presidential popu- 
larity. The infrequency with which presidential elections actually occur has 
the opposite effect on students of the presidential vote. Only Niskanen (1975) 
and Fair (1982) have carred out analyses and votes analogous to those for 
approval. 
Niskanen examined the 20 elections between 1896 and 1972, regressing the 
log of the incumbent party’s vote on economic variables, the previous party 
vote, and incumbency. A noteworthy feature of his analysis is that changes in 
the economy were measured across the four-year interval between elections. 
While there is some disagreement in the literature, the modal analysis sup- 
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ports a shorter frame of reference (i.e., myopic voters). Nonetheless, Niska- 
nen’s  estimates indicate that voter support for presidents is significantly re- 
lated to real per capita net national product since the previous election. 
Fair develops a general model that  includes Kramer’s backward-looking 
voters as a special case, but with so few observations-the  22 elections be- 
tween 1892 and 1976-he  is not able to analyze the full model. Constrained 
analyses indicate that the presidential vote responds to the growth rate of real 
per capita GNP, change in unemployment, and perhaps to change in the price 
level. Developments in the election year appear to be most important, except 
in the case of prices where a two-year change is better. 
The 1980s provided Fair (1982, 1988) the opportunity to update the basic 
model. With the 1980 and 1984 elections included in the estimation the nega- 
tive electoral effect of  inflation becomes more apparent. And the evidence of 
voter myopia grows stronger, as the growth rate of GNP during the second and 
third quarters of  the election year is more important than change measured 
over a longer interval. For purposes of this discussion the most interesting 
question is how  well the original Fair model predicts  the elections of  the 
1980s. Coefficient estimates based on the  1892-1976  elections predict that 
Reagan would get about 53 percent of the vote in 1980, an underestimate of 2 
percent, and 55 percent of the vote in 1984, an underestimate of about 4 per- 
cent. Bush was predicted to get only 49 percent of the vote in 1988, an under- 
estimate of  5 percent.’ Do the underestimates for the 1980s elections reflect 
the vaunted Reagan personality factor? Probably not. Fair’s equations do not 
take account of foreign relations, which were working against the Democrats 
in  all three elections.‘j Thus, these underestimates are perfectly comprehen- 
sible. 
In  view of  the data limitations and theoretical difficulties encountered by 
analyses like Niskanen’s and  fair'^,^ and given the existence of high-quality 
election year surveys, political scientists have concentrated on cross-sectional 
analysis of the effects of the economy and economic issues on the presidential 
vote. The existence and importance of  economic influences has never been 
much in question; rather, the variety of such effects and the manner in which 
they operate have been the concerns of political scientists. Numerous analyses 
demonstrate that voting reflects individual perceptions of both one’s own eco- 
nomic circumstances (Fiorina  1978), and of  the broader economic climate 
(Kinder and Kiewiet 1979). Judgments of  the economic performance of  the 
government are most important of all, but such judgments reflect factors such 
as partisanship and candidate attractiveness as well  as pure economic per- 
formance (Fiorina 1981b). To  some extent perceptions of  the condition of 
their group (eg., blacks, farmers) shapes how people react to real economic 
conditions (Kinder, Adams, and Gronke 1989). In general, the political sci- 
ence cross-sectional studies suggest that the individual behavior underlying 
aggregate election results is more heterogeneous (Rivers 1988) and more com- 
plicated than might appear from an examination of aggregate time-series anal- 21  Elections and the Economy 
yses. Voters do not simply look at their wallets and vote accordingly; rather, 
they make a more complex judgment that reflects individual, sectoral, and 
national conditions, both those already realized and others only expected. 
Complications aside, however, it was these cross-sectional studies that es- 
tablished that  1980 was  largely a rejection of Jimmy Carter’s performance 
rather than an endorsement of  supply-side economics (Markus 1982; Miller 
and  Wattenberg 1985). Similarly, cross-sectional studies established that in 
1984 voters chose Reagan despite closer agreement with Mondale on issues 
such as defense spending, Central America, and abortion. They chose Reagan 
because they thought he had performed well as president, and one of the rea- 
sons they thought he  had  performed  well  was because the  economy was 
thought to be strong (Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde 1986). At the time of 
this writing, cross-sectional studies are establishing that George Bush’s vic- 
tory in 1988 was not just an artifact of the diabolical cleverness of Republican 
media wizards. Rather, he won because the economy continued strong and 
people who approved of  Reagan’s performance transferred their approval to 
Bush (Shanks and Miller 1990; Weisberg 1989). 
1.1.4  Economic Conditions and the Congressional Vote 
Kramer’s 1971 article is clearly the seminal piece in the modem study of 
economics and elections. Taking the House elections between 1896 and 1964, 
Kramer regressed the aggregate Republican vote on a series of economic var- 
iables including unemployment, inflation, and real income. The estimates in- 
dicate that variations in  real income carried the explanatory weight in the 
equation, with a 1 percent decline in real income producing a .5 percent de- 
cline in the House vote share of the administration. 
Kramer’s model assumed identical economic effects in presidential and off- 
year elections. Noting that, with the exception of 1934, the incumbent admin- 
istration had lost House seats in every midterm election since the Civil War, 
Tufte (1975) argued that off-year elections should be treated separately as ref- 
erenda on the performance of the incumbent President. Taking the eight elec- 
tions between  1946 and  1974, Tufte regressed (the logit of) the aggregate 
congressional vote on the rate of change in real per capita disposable income 
during the election year, presidential approval at the time of the election, and 
a measure of the “baseline” vote. His estimate of the vote consequence of real 
income change (.35 percent) is smaller than Kramer’s but this estimate is net 
of  changes in presidential popularity that, as noted above, also varies with 
changes in real income. 
Forecasting the results of  congressional elections quickly developed into a 
cottage industry, with producers such as Jacobson and Kernel1 (1983), Lewis- 
Beck and Rice (1984), and Campbell (1985). Like the Tufte  model, all of 
these refinements include measures of  presidential approval and economic 
conditions and in  some way  or another take account of differences between 
midterm and presidential-year  election^.^ The models differ in their assump- 22  Morris P.  Fiorina 
tions about the lags with which presidential approval and economic conditions 
affect the election results. Oppenheimer, Stimson, and Waterman (1986) add 
an “exposure” variable that represents the number of seats held by  a party in 
excess of its “normal” holding. A party that is highly exposed (the 1966 Dem- 
ocrats) is in greater danger than one that is minimally exposed (the 1986 Re- 
publicans). In a sense the exposure variable provides a substantive explana- 
tion for an observed regression to the mean. 
How  well did such models perform in  the  1980s? Each election tends to 
yield a new winner, but as a group they do quite well.Io The Marra-Ostrom 
model  (1989) misses the  1984 outcome by  one seat.I’ The  1986 case was 
particularly instructive. Early in the election year journalists speculated about 
the “six-year itch.” Since 1932 the average midterm seat loss for the party of 
a reelected president was more than 50 (Cook 1985). So, in a classic case of 
naive forecasting some pundits anticipated a Republican disaster. In actual 
fact the Republicans lost only five seats, one of the smallest midterm losses 
ever, but  exactly as predicted by  Marra and Ostrom and  very close to the 
prediction of  Oppenheimer et al.  (1986) (seven) for a minimally exposed 
party. There have been some disastrous sixth year showings, but they reflect 
conditions (the 1938 and 1958 recessions, the 1966 city and campus riots, and 
the 1974 recession and Watergate crisis) that were not present in 1986. 
Although the accuracy of  the congressional models is impressive, their 
forecasting performance again exceeds our capacity to describe the underlying 
behavioral processes. For one thing, the early studies of Kramer (1971) and 
nfte (1975) sought to predict the House vote, whereas the later generation 
models focus directly on House seats. The justification for the shift is that the 
analyst is interested in a system-level response (control of  Congress) to a 
system-level condition (state of  the economy). This is obviously a specious 
argument. Seats are not affected directly by economic conditions; seats do not 
experience employment or inflation; seats do not vote. The United States has 
a single-member simple plurality (SMSP) electoral system, not a proportional 
representation (PR) system, and, as is well known, SMSP systems translate 
seats into votes in a nonproportional and variable manner (Gudgin and Taylor 
1979). Moreover, there is evidence that the translation of  votes into seats 
underwent a structural change in the 1960s, a regime shift not incorporated in 
existing midterm models (Ansolabehere, Brady, and Fiorina 1988). Neverthe- 
less, such models forecast rather accurately. Apparently aggregation saves the 
forecasting models from the  consequences of  their  logically questionable 
specifications. 
A second area of uncertainty again involves the microbehavior that under- 
lies the  effects of  aggregate economic conditions. Cross-sectional studies 
using survey data have found no effect of individual financial condition on the 
congressional voting, at least after 1960 (Fiorina 1978). This has stimulated 
two alternative theories. First, Kinder and Kiewiet (1979, 1981) argue that 
voting behavior is based less on individual economic circumstances than on 23  Elections and the Economy 
individual perceptions of  collective circumstances, that  voters  are  “soci- 
otropic” rather than individually self-interested. Second, Jacobson and Ker- 
nell (1983) maintain that the effect of  economic conditions on elections is 
partially a self-fulfilling prophecy, as strong candidates decline to run and 
contributors decline to give in “bad” years for their party.  For this reason the 
Jacobson and  Kernel1 forecasts utilize presidential approval and economic 
conditions in the spring of the election year, since that is when the deadlines 
for candidate filing occur. 
Kramer (1983) mounted a vigorous attack on these lines of work, arguing 
that cross-sectional variation in real income does not much reflect government 
policies or actions, whereas a substantial portion of temporal variation does. 
Thus, cross-sectional studies of  economic conditions and voting are essen- 
tially useless. Markus (1988) and Rivers (1990) utilize pooled time-series 
cross-sectional designs to refute Kramer partially and to identify some indi- 
vidual basis for the aggregate results. At this time, scholarly guns are quiet, 
but the matter is still open. 
Finally, several scholars recently have questioned the very existence of  a 
direct link between aggregate economic conditions and midterm election re- 
sults. They argue that although economic conditions affect the presidential 
vote two years prior, the midterm loss reflects a “presidential penalty” (Erik- 
son  1988,  1990) or “moderation” of  the president (Alesina and Rosenthal 
1989) that is not a direct effect of the economic circumstances prevailing be- 
tween the presidential and midterm elections. Jacobson (1990) rebuts these 
analyses, questioning their specifications, and suggesting alternative specifi- 
cations under which recent economic conditions do affect the congressional 
outcome. For present purposes, the answer to this question is not important. 
Even if Erikson, Alesina, and Rosenthal are correct, they do not suggest that 
the 1980s are in any way different; rather, the implication of their work is that 
analysts misinterpreted the data all along. 
In sum, whatever the resolution of the remaining puzzles and controversies 
about the effects of the economy on public opinion and national voting, it is 
clear that they derive from the normal progress of a research program. Noth- 
ing about the politics of the 1980s called into question models first developed 
in the 1970s. From the standpoint of the short-term effects of  the economy, 
the 1980s have been politics as usual. 
1.2  Economic Conditions and the Party Balance 
The work discussed in the preceding section focuses on the short-term ef- 
fects of the economy, that is, the impact of economic conditions on particular 
decisions, like whom to support in presidential and congressional contests. 
Such analyses implicitly view elections as determined by  the particular cir- 
cumstances surrounding them. The apparent statistical evidence for voter my- 24  Morris P.  Fiorina 
opia further reinforces that presumption. But while the particular circum- 
stances surrounding elections obviously are  important, political  scientists 
have long been aware that election outcomes also reflect long-term factors that 
are relatively constant from election to election. One such long-term factor is 
party image, the popular view of  a party based on a history of  policy and 
performance extending considerably beyond the previous two quarters. For 
more than a generation Americans viewed the Democratic party as the party 
of prosperity.L2  From the time Gallup began asking the question in the early 
1940s until  1981, the Democrats trailed the Republicans only three times.I3 
The Republicans pulled  ahead in  1981, fell back  in  1982-83,  and  pulled 
ahead for good in  1984. Most students of elections considered this develop- 
ment as important as the actual election results of  the 1980s, for the simple 
reason that many voters are innocent of the particular candidates and issues in 
an election and vote on the basis of these general, long-standing party images. 
For election analysts the quintessential long-term force is party identifica- 
tion, called partisanship or party ID for short. Gallup has never taken a poll in 
which more respondents identified themselves as Republicans than as Demo- 
crats. The same is true for the American National Election Studies (NES). 
Every postelection survey, including those in which Republicans embarrassed 
the Democratic opposition (1956, 1972, 1980, 1984, 1988), has found a plu- 
rality of citizens classifying themselves as Democrats. In panel studies (inter- 
views with the same respondents at two or more times) no survey item shows 
greater stability, and movements in aggregate party ID typically are described 
as “glacial” (table 1.1 and fig. 1.1). 
So impressed by  its stability were the first students of party identification 
that they likened it to popular religious affiliations-learned  in  childhood, 
devoid of  doctrinal underpinnings, and impervious to change in  later life 
(Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960). Not only was it a preexisting 
“bias” that most voters carried into the voting booth, but it also served as a 
“perceptual screen” through which voters selectively perceived the candi- 
dates, issues, and conditions of the time. Election analyses of the 1960s pro- 
nounced party ID to be the single most important factor in American elec- 
tions. 
Developments of the late 1960s and early 1970s led to revisions in the pre- 
vailing view First, there was the much-discussed rise in self-identified inde- 
pendents. By the late 1970s pundits regularly referred to independents as the 
second largest “party,” ahead of the Republicans.I4  Second, there was an ero- 
sion of “strong” partisans, as fewer respondents admitted to an unconditional 
affiliation with either party. Third, there was a weakening of the link between 
professed  party  identification and  the  presidential  vote,  as  self-identified 
Democrats blithely chose Republican presidential candidates. Stimulated by 
such anomolies younger researchers began to contemplate the possibility that 
party ID was not an unmoved mover and took the heretical step of putting it 
on the left-hand side in their analyses. Jackson (1975) showed that party ID 25  Elections and the Economy 
Table 1.1  Party Identification, 1952-88 (in %) 
Year  Strong DEM  Weak  DEM  Leaning DEM  INDEP  Leaning REP  Weak REP  Strong REP 
~ 
1952  22  25  10  6  7  14  14 
1954  22  26  9  7  6  14  13 
1956  21  23  6  9  8  14  15 
1958  27  22  7  7  5  17  11 
1960  20  25  6  10  7  14  16 
1962  23  23  7  8  9  16  12 
1964  27  25  9  8  6  14  11 
1966  18  28  9  12  7  15  10 
1968  20  25  10  11  9  15  10 
1970  20  24  10  13  8  15  9 
1972  15  26  11  13  11  13  10 
1974  18  21  13  15  9  14  8 
1976  15  25  12  15  10  14  9 
1978  15  24  14  14  10  13  8 
1980  18  23  11  13  10  14  9 
1982  20  24  11  11  8  14  10 
1984  17  20  11  11  12  15  12 
1986  18  22  10  12  11  15  11 
1988  17  18  12  10  13  14  14 
Source: National Election Studies. 
Note: DEM = Democrat; INDEP = independent; REP = Republican. 
was partly a function of the issue positions held by  voters. Fiorina (1981a) 
demonstrated  that party ID moved with judgments of party performance. Such 
analyses did not deny that party ID was “sticky”-it  clearly has a strong in- 
ertial component. But these analyses did establish that aggregate stability 
masked  politically  explicable individual movement.  Today,  the  prevailing 
view is that partisanship continues to be one of the most important factors in 
how  people vote. No  cross-sectional analysis of  voting could be  published 
without including it.I5 But partisanship responds, albeit slowly, to evaluations 
of party positions and judgments of government performance. 
Thus, when electoral analysts search for a Reagan “legacy,” they look be- 
yond his personal victories to shifts in the underlying distribution of party ID 
that would indicate the end of  the New  Deal Democratic majority and the 
emergence of  a new Republican majority. Nothing so grand appears to have 
occurred, but change on a smaller scale has become increasingly apparent. 
Between the mid-1960s and mid-1970s the  Democrats lost ground among 
white Southerners and blue-collar workers, losses that surely owe much to the 
party’s stands on racial and social issues (Petrocik 1987; 1989). But Republi- 
can ID showed no commensurate gain during this period. In the mid-1980s 
however, Republican ID did move upward especially among the young (Nor- 
poth 1987; Norpoth and Kagay 1989).16 
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Fig. 1.1  Party identification in the United States, 1952-88 
tribution of recent Republican electoral successes to economic good times, it 
is somewhat surprising that few analysts have focused on economic develop- 
ments as the basis for recent changes in party ID. The inflation set in motion 
by  Lyndon Johnson and uncontrolled by  Carter ate away at nominal wage 
gains and pushed workers into higher tax brackets. Meanwhile, Democratic 
identification eroded from its 1964 high. Then, an electorate that yelled "No!" 
when queried whether they were better off today than four years ago elected 
Ronald Reagan, who stopped inflation and presided over a sustained recovery. 
Meanwhile, Republican identification strengthened. Coincidence? 
Probably not. In an important recent contribution MacKuen, Erikson, and 
Stimson (1989) analyze a Gallup party ID series (1953-87).  They find that, 
like presidential popularity, fluctuations in quarterly party ID averages are sig- 
nificantly associated with fluctuations in the economy, in this case consumer 
confidence as measured by the University of  Michigan Surveys of Consumer 
Attitudes. 
The remainder of  this paper extends and refines the MacKuen-Erikson- 
Stimson analysis. Using National Election Studies (NES) data, losses in Dem- 
ocratic identification and gains in Republican identification can be located in 
the 33d to 95th percentiles of the income distribution, with somewhat offset- 
ting gains in Democratic identification in the bottom sixth of the distribution. 
At all income levels expressed party identification varies with economic con- 27  Elections and the Economy 
ditions, though the poor and the better-off show differential sensitivity to un- 
employment and growth. 
1.2.1  Data 
The NES surveys have been carried out after each national election since 
1952.” Their national samples range from a low of 1,139 in 1954 to a high of 
2,705 in 1972, with the number being a joint function of available resources 
and the larger intellectual themes underlying each survey. The common con- 
tent in these surveys is available in a major collection called the Cumulative 
Data File (CDF) that reorganizes the data so that variable numbers, codes, and 
so on,  are identical from year to year. The CDF now contains 19 observations 
on  national party identification.I8 
The CDF classifies respondents very roughly into five income categories. 
These are not quintiles, however, but represent instead a more sociological 
interpretation of income.19  The lowest category, whom I will call the “poor,” 
runs through the 16th percentile of the income distribution. The next category, 
the “lower-middle” runs through the 33d percentile. The “middle” category 
includes the third of the distribution from the 34th to 67th percentiles. The 
“upper-middle” category runs from the 68th to 95th percentiles. Finally, the 
“rich” are the top five percent (noneconomists will be surprised and sobered 
to learn that in 1988 the 96th percentile was a bit less than $90,000.)20 
Table 1.2  reports a preliminary examination  of trends in party ID within the 
income categories. Because of the controversy surrounding the classification 
of independent leaners, I have examined both ways: “broad” Democrats and 
Republicans include the Democratic and Republican leaning independents as 
partisans, while “narrow” Democrats and Republicans exclude Democrat and 
Republican leaners. Within each income category I have regressed the mea- 
sures of  partisanship on a constant, on the election year (1952-88),  and on 
Table 1.2  ’Lkends in Party ID by Income Category 
NalTOW  DEM  Broad DEM  NalTOW  REP  Broad REP 
Lower  -  .02  .24  -  .41  -  .23 
~23)  (2.38)  (4.37)  (2.48) 
Lower-middle  -.16  .03  -  .08  -  .04 
(2.38)  (.35)  (.88)  (.43) 
Middle  -  .38  -  .22  -  .05  .09 
(5.71)  (3.40)  (.78)  (1.25) 
Upper-middle  -  .42  -  .36  .01  .26 
(8.29)  (6.37)  ~24)  (3.58) 
Upper  -  .ll  -  .07  -.I6  .05 
(.78)  (.43)  (.97)  (  .26) 
Note: Entries are regression coefficients of Party ID (% in each category) on time (1952-88)  and 
dummy variables  for 1964 and 1974. Absolute values of ?-statistics  are in parentheses. DEM  = 
Democrat; REP = Republican. 28  Morris P.  Fiorina 
dummy variables for Goldwater (1964) and Watergate (1974), both of which 
were thought to have “shocked” partisanship. To  summarize: 
1. The poorest segment of the population shows a clear loss in Republican 
partisanship, narrowly and broadly defined, and a gain in Democratic parti- 
sanship, broadly defined (i.e. independent, but leaning Democratic). 
2. The lower-middle category has the most stable party affiliations of all the 
categories, showing only a slight decline in narrowly defined Democratic ID. 
3. The middle third of  the distribution shows a significant decline in Dem- 
ocratic partisanship, but no commensurate gain in Republican partisanship. 
4. The upper-middle sixth shows a clear decline in Democratic ID along 
with a clear rise in  Republican ID, broadly defined (i.e.,  independent, but 
leaning Republican). 
5. Because of  the small number of  rich respondents, partisanship figures 
fluctuate greatly. None of  the coefficients are significant in the four regres- 
sions. 
These preliminary regressions are unimpressive, with low R2s and unsatis- 
factory Durbin-Watson (D-W) statistics, but they suggest that the party loyal- 
ties of the population have not moved in unison during the past generation. 
Rather, different parts of  the income distribution show different movements. 
The question now arises as to whether the addition of suitable economic vari- 
ables can improve on the statistical qualities of the regressions and add to our 
substantive understanding of the observed movements in party identification. 
The answer is a clear yes. 
Table 1.3  reports regressions that augment those just reported in two ways. 
First, previous party ID was added to the equations in order to capture the 
notion of party ID as a running tally of party performance that is continuously 
updated as the world unfolds (Fiorina 1981a). Second, various economic var- 
iables were added to the equations. With only  19 observations, collinearity 
often precluded including more than one or two economic variables in  an 
equation; in such cases I kept the variable that produced the best overall equa- 
tion.*l Usually such decisions were not difficult, but in a few cases two alter- 
native specifications were so close in their performance that I present both in 
table  1.3. In the interest of  efficiency I omitted the Goldwater, Watergate, 
lagged Partisanship, and trend terms when they fell far short of significance, 
except in a few cases where their omission greatly detracted from the quality 
of  the overall regression or the performance of  other variables.22  Table  1.3 
provides the details. Again, I will summarize the findings rather than proceed- 
ing seriatim through 25 regressions. 
1. Poor. Within the lowest income category there continues to be a trend 
away from the Republicans and toward the Democrats, broadly defined. Gold- 
water’s candidacy added about 10 points to Democratic ID and detracted at 
least that much from Republican ID. Of  most interest, movements in party 
ID, however measured, are associated with changes in the level of unemploy- 
ment. Democratic ID responds most strongly to unemployment change since 29  Elections and the Economy 
Table 1.3  Economic Conditions and Party ID Change 
Category and 
Variable  NDEM  BDEM  NREP  NREP  BREP  BREP 
A. Low income: 
Constant  47.66 
(48.78) 

























-  16.49 
(4.81) 
(2.32) 
-  1.38 
35.22 
(3.19) 













-  15.16 
(3.65) 
-  2.53 
(3.34) 
Lag ID 
GW  10.78 
(2.62) 
AUEl  ... 
AUE2  1.37 
(2.19) 
RZ  .35 




-  .98 
(2.30) 
.82 
-  1.75 
(3.43) 
.60  .83  .59 
NDEM  BDEM  NREP  BREP 
B. Lower-middle income: 
Constant  56.72 
EY  -  .I4 
(12.31) 
(2.12) 
Lag ID  ... 
GW  11.69 
(3.83) 














-  12.03 
(2.66) 
-  10.15 
-2.83 





...  ... 
AUE2  .69 
(I  .45) 
Rz  .56 





-  .92 
(1.76) 
.35 
NDEM  BDEM  BDEM  NREP  BREP 
C. Middle income: 
Constant  64.80  63.50 
(  17.94)  (18.78) 
(6.24)  (2.99) 
EY  -  .31  -.14 
Lag ID  ...  ... 
GW  9.33  9.41 
(3.98)  (4.16) 
64.71  12.29  25.45 
(21.24)  (2.36)  (4.49) 
-.I5  ...  ... 
(3.71) 
...  .49  .26 
(2.21)  (1.51) 
9.68  ...  -7.69 
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Table 1.3  Continued 
Category and 
Variable  NDEM  BDEM  BDEM  NREP  BREP 
W  ...  ...  -4.02  -  6.24 
(1.50)  (2.39) 
AGNPI  -  .77 
(3.99) 
AGNP2  ... 
-  .81 
(4.35) 
-  .09 
(1.40) 
...  ...  ... 
UE  .44 
(3.50) 







...  -  1.51 
(3.84) 
.32  .64  R2  .86 
D-W  2.14 
.79 
1.91 
NDEM  BDEM  BDEM  NREP  BREP 
D. Upper-middle income: 
Constant  65.84 
(19.50) 
EY  -  .38 
(7.93) 
Lag ID  ... 
W  -5.08 
AGNPI  -  .33 
(2.44) 



































-  .84 
(2.33) 
AUE2  .90 
(3.12) 
-  1.25 
(3.34) 
R2  .86  .90  .91  .41  .75 
D-W  2.44  ...  ...  ...  1.94 
NDEM  BDEM  NREP  NREP  BREP 
E. Upper income: 
Constant  24.68  33.25 
(5.28)  (5.05) 
EY  ... 
(2.97) 
Lag ID  -  .07  -  .02 
.43  (.I3 
W  -  14.16  -  5.85 
(2.96)  (1.12) 
66.29  64.09  50.36 
(5.87)  (5.98)  (3.86) 
-  .31  -  .28  ... 
(2.02)  (2.09)  (2.60) 
...  ...  .12 
(.  74) 
9.29  5.99  5.67 
(1.31)  (35)  (35) 31  Elections and the Economy 
Table 1.3  Continued 
Category and 
Variable  NDEM  BDEM  NREP  NREP  BREP 
AGNPl  -  1.04  -  1.40  1.13  ...  ... 
AGNP2  ...  ...  .58  .80 
(2.65)  (3.61) 
R1  .54  .53  .24  .26  .44 
D-W  ...  ...  1.93  1.88  ... 
(3.61)  (4.56)  (2.52) 
Note: EY  = election year; GW = Goldwater (1964 =  I); W = Watergate (1974 = 1); Lag ID 
= percentage in  party ID category 2 years earlier; AUE1  = change in  unemployment during 
election year; AUE2 = change in unemployment since last election year; AGNPl  = growth rate 
of  GNP during election year; AGNP2  = growth rate of  GNP since last election year; UE  = 
unemployment level in election year. Absolute values of ?-statistics  are in parentheses. 
the lust election, while changes in Republican ID are predicted equally well 
by one-year or two-year changes. Looking at the two-year change equations, 
a one-point rise  in  unemployment goes along with  a two-point net  swing 
in narrowly defined ID and a three- or  four-point net swing in broadly de- 
fined ID. 
2. Lower-middle. Within the lower-middle income category the trend away 
from narrowly defined Democratic ID becomes clearer. Goldwater’s candi- 
dacy  had  roughly  a  10 point  impact on  all categories; Watergate affected 
broadly defined Republicanism only. While the estimates are more tenuous 
than those for the poor, movements in all four measures of  party ID show 
some responsiveness to two-year changes in  unemployment, with estimated 
magnitudes about three-fourths as large as in the lowest income category. 
3, Middle. Within the large middle-income category the previously identi- 
fied trend away from the Democrats remains intact. The Goldwater candidacy 
gave the Democrats almost 10 points and Watergate took half as much away 
from the Republicans. The economic impacts on partisanship are different 
from those in lower income categories. Democratic ID shows a highly signif- 
icant relationship to the growth rate of GNP and to the unemployment level 
during the election year.  Thus, the  1982 unemployment level of  almost 10 
percent added about 4 points to Democratic ID, and the 6.75 percent growth 
in GNP in 1984 took away 5 points of Democratic ID. In contrast, movements 
in narrowly defined Republican ID show no relation to economic variables, 
and movements in broadly defined Republican ID correspond only to move- 
ments in two-year changes in ~nemployment.~~ 
4. Upper-middle. Within the upper-middle income category the Democrats 
have clearly been losing and the Republicans less clearly gaining. Although 
all categories except narrow Republicans show a significant relationship with 
growth of GNP,  the relationship is only half as strong as in the middle cate- 
gory. Moreover, narrowly defined Democrats and broadly defined Republi- 32  Morris P. Fiorina 
cans show a response to one-year changes, while narrowly defined Republi- 
cans show a response to two-year changes, and broadly defined Democrats 
show a response to both. All categories except narrow Democrat show a sig- 
nificant relation to two-year changes in unemployment, with each one-point 
increase in unemployment taking away one point of narrow Republican ID 
and creating a net swing of two points in broad ID. In this group Watergate 
took away a few points of narrow Democratic ID. 
5.  Rich. Among the rich, Democratic ID rises and falls with the growth rate 
of GNP,  though Democrats show more of a response to the short term and 
Republicans to the longer term. Each one-point increase is associated with a 
two-point net shift in the narrow ID balance. Only in this blessed category 
does party ID show no sensitivity at all to unemployment. Watergate was 
costly to the Democrats within this category with a particularly strong impact 
on narrowly defined Democratic ID. 
Overall, these simple analyses support two arguments. First, party identi- 
fication responds not only to perceived economic conditions as established by 
MacKuen et al. (1989). The finding is stronger: party ID shows a clear rela- 
tionship to fluctuations in actual economic conditions. Second, the party loy- 
alties of the population do not move in unison as the economy moves; different 
income levels respond in different ways.  Not surprisingly, the less affluent 
show a greater sensitivity to changes in unemployment, whereas general eco- 
nomic expansion has greater importance among those who enjoy higher in- 
come levels. 
Finally, I emphasize that nothing in the foregoing analyses conflicts with 
the extensive political science literature on  the subject. The adjustment of 
previous party ID as new performance information becomes available is con- 
sistent with micromodels already supported by  cross-sectional data (Fiorina 
1981a)." And the economic effects that we have found do not detract from the 
discussions of race and social issues as sources of the Democratic party's cur- 
rent  disarray.  Most of  the regressions for the  lower-middle, middle, and 
upper-middle income groups show a significant anti-Democratic trend that 
may well reflect the party's estrangement from middle America on issues of 
race and culture. But whatever other issues are at work, the economy contin- 
ues to influence the underlying balance of party affiliations  just as it did during 
the New Deal and as it will undoubtedly continue to do in the future. 
1.3  Conclusion 
The economic developments of the 1980s had an impact on the electoral 
politics of  the decade, an impact not only on the outcomes of  the elections 
held between 1980 and 1988, but also on the elections that will occur in the 
1990s and  possibly  beyond.  Economic conditions affected the  immediate 
election outcomes to the Democrats' dismay in 1980, 1984, and 1988, and to 
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left an imprint on the distribution of party identification among the citizenry. 
Whatever the economic conditions that existed in  1988, the conditions that 
existed in 1984 and earlier had been incorporated in voter partisanship to the 
general good fortune of George Bush. 
Of course, economic bad times under Bush would have the reverse effects. 
The hard-won gains in Republican ID during the 1980s could be dissipated by 
economic misfortunes in the years ahead. Fortunately for the Republicans 
they have been profiting from Democratic policies and performance in other 
issue domains such as raciaVcultural issues and foreign policy; economic suc- 
cess was the third ace in their hand. Thus, less-than-stellar economic perform- 
ance need not cost them presidential elections, nor even all their gains in party 
identification. But continued economic success would buttress the gains they 
already have made. And attention to employment, in particular, would enable 
them to continue to make inroads in the lower ranges of the income distribu- 
tion that are traditionally viewed as “natural” Democratic territory. 
Notes 
1.  Of  course, the Republicans did lose control of  the Senate in  1986. Economic 
distress in farm states was often cited as a partial explanation. But the 1980 Senate 
victories that were reversed in 1986 were something of a fluke to begin with (Fiorina 
1984). 
2.  A number of excellent reviews are available. On the effects of  economic condi- 
tions on voting and presidential approval see Monroe (1979) and Kiewiet and Rivers 
(1984). For an excellent general review that deals with sociological as well  as eco- 
nomic aspects of  the topic  see Weatherford (1986). And for a review  of  the recent 
political business cycle literature see Alesina (1988). 
3.  Generally, when a president’s ratings plummet,  they never fully recover. Rea- 
gan’s, however, dropped from 67 percent in the flush of  his 1981 legislative victories 
to 35 percent after the 1982 elections. But by  late 1983 he was back over 50 percent 
and, following his  reelection, hovered  near 65  percent  through  most  of  1985-86. 
While analysts were studying this unusual recovery, the Iran-Contra scandal dropped 
him back to 40 percent, but again he recovered and left office with approval ratings 
over 60  percent. 
4.  Ostrom and Simon (1989) attribute more than three-fourths of  the 1981-82  de- 
cline and the  1983-84  resurgence to economic factors. Particular events (Lebanon 
bombings, Grenada, etc.) also were important. Speeches had no significant impact, 
presidential trips were of minor import. 
5. For the  1980 and  1984 elections I utilized eq. 4 and the data reported  in Fair 
(1982). (This is the original 1892-1976  equation reestimated with national accounts 
data revised  in  1980.) For the 1988 prediction I substituted NBER data generously 
provided by Gerald Cohen. 
6.  According to numerous survey studies, the Iranian hostage crisis severely dam- 
aged Carter in  1980. Conversely,  in  1984 the Grenada invasion, destruction of  the 
Libyan MIGs, and the capture of  the hijackers of  the Achille-Lauro buttressed Rea- 
gan’s image  as a no-nonsense leader.  The administration had  a major arms control 34  Morris P.  Fiorina 
treaty by  1988. A recent update of Fair’s model (1988) adds a variable that measures 
change in the size of the armed forces relative to the population. While this captures 
major wars, it will not pick up incidents and developments such as those just men- 
tioned. 
7. To get enough data, time-series analysts must venture across what political scien- 
tists and historians refer to as different party systems (where structural changes are 
hypothesized). For example, Fair (1978) observes that the model performs badly be- 
fore 1916, though that is not a date ordinarily identified with a change in party system. 
He also cautions (1988) that the positive-trend term for the Democrats appears ques- 
tionable in light of 1980s political developments. Political historians would argue that 
the Democratic base was higher  in the New Deal party system (1932-64,  approxi- 
mately) than either before or since. While Fair could dummy in such considerations, 
he naturally worries about being accused of “mining” his data. 
8. These findings do not necessarily contradict the time-series finding that voters 
are myopic.  If  voters are heterogeneous,  with varying time horizons,  different foci 
(national vs. local), differential sensitivities to growth, unemployment, and inflation, 
etc., it may be difficult to find evidence of nonmyopic behavior inasmuch as different 
voters will incorporate different information  in different ways.  For a discussion of 
voter  rationality  that  touches  on time  horizons  among  other  things,  see Nordhaus 
(1989). 
9.  Some, like Jacobson and Kernel1 (1983) and Campbell (1985), use only mid- 
terms for their estimations.  Others, like Lewis-Beck and Rice (1984) use a dummy 
variable for midterms. 
10. The one exception was 1982 when all the models overestimated the Republican 
losses.  Jacobson  and Kernel1 (1983) argue that in the euphoria following Reagan’s 
1980 victory, the Republicans were able to recruit good candidates and raise consider- 
able money, which cushioned their losses when the economy turned sour in late 1981. 
11. This model incorporates all the others. It predicts across presidential and mid- 
term years, includes the exposure variable, and also includes measures of major events 
(as in approval models) and party identification. 
12. With somewhat less regularity  the Republicans were viewed as the party of 
peace. 
13. April 1943, December 1955, and September 1972. 
14. This turns out to be a highly controversial matter. Unlike Gallup, academic 
surveys ask self-identified independents whether they lean toward either party. The rise 
in independents occurred almost entirely  among these “leaners,” whose presidential 
votes are often more loyal than those of weak partisans of the same party. See (Keith 
et al. 1987). 
15.  Assuming no interactions with other variables, time-series analyses will pick up 
the average level of party ID in the constant term. 
16.  There is some disagreement on this point, with some subscribing to the “young 
Republican” thesis (Norpoth  1987; Miller  1990), while other argue that Republican 
gains are more evenly scattered across the age distribution (Petrocik 1989). The CBS/ 
NYT data appears to give somewhat different answers than NES data, and classifying 
independent leaners  as partisans  gives somewhat different answers than classifying 
them as independents (see n. 14 above). 
17. Since 1952 election year surveys have been carried out under the auspices of 
the Institute for Survey Research at the University of Michigan. Since 1978 these sur- 
veys have been funded by the National Science Foundation and carried out under the 
supervision of an academic governing board. 
18. Although the Gallup series is longer, the NES series has two advantages. The 
first is simple convenience. Take the income variable,  for instance.  The NES staff 35  Elections and the Economy 
codes each respondent according to national income percentile. To use Gallup data, 
one would have to take each Gallup survey and do the calculations and recoding one- 
self. Even if bountiful research assistance were available, however, the NES collection 
would  still be preferable  for present  purposes.  Gallup makes only a simple three- 
category classification of party ID, whereas the NES differentiates between strong and 
weak partisans and pure and learning independents.  As noted in n.  14 above, these 
finer differences are  consequential. 
19. Personal conversation  with Warren Miller, principal investigator of  the NES 
surveys, April 13, 1990. 
20.  Since respondents  are not asked their exact incomes, but only a range, these 
proportions are only approximate. In 1988 the upper boundaries of the first four cate- 
gories were $9,999, $14,999, $34,999, and $89,999. 
2  1. In all cases the economic variables are multiplied by a binary variable for con- 
trol of the Presidency (Democrat = -  1, Republican = 1). Good economic conditions 
under Republican presidents  are expected to enhance Republican partisanship while 
detracting from Democratic partisanship, and poor economic performance should have 
the opposite effect. I did consider the alternative hypotheses that the parties “own” 
different issues, so that inflation always helps Republicans and unemployment Demo- 
crats even if  they are in office when it occurs.  Fortunately (in view of  the perverse 
incentives posited by these hypotheses) I found no support for them. Keech and Swain 
(1990) argue however, that particularly sensitive subpopulations-e.g.,  blacks-be- 
have somewhat in line with the alternative hypotheses. At this level of aggregation I 
can not take account of their argument. 
22.  One might object that the dummy variables for 1964 and 1974 act as proxies for 
the economic conditions  (quite good in  1964, quite poor in  1974) that prevailed in 
those years and thus detract from the impact of the economic variables in the regres- 
sions. On the contrary, eliminating the Goldwater and Watergate dummies when sig- 
nificant generally detracts greatly from the overall regressions and produces weaker 
impacts for the economic variables.  In short, there was more to the  1964 and 1974 
experiences than good and bad economic times, respectively. 
23.  Note that an alternative specification for broadly defined Democrats also sug- 
gests the importance of two-year changes in unemployment. 
24.  Some readers have asked why few of  the lagged party ID terms attain signifi- 
cance when they are invariably highly significant in cross-sectional analyses. The an- 
swer appears to be the aggregate  level of analysis.  In the absence of  a time trend, 
aggregate ID levels fluctuate around the constant baseline in accord with variations in 
economic variables. 
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COl'llmeIlt  William D. Nordhaus 
The paper by  Morns Fiorina is an informative and measured survey of  the 
literature on the impact of economic events upon political variables. In partic- 
ular, the first part provides a review of the existing literature that will be most 
helpful for those who are looking for a political scientist's view of recent de- 
velopments in this area. He argues that the 1980s did not bring a major revo- 
lution or realignment in politics in America, and that it was more a combina- 
tion of past trends and good economic performance that led to the Republican 
ascendancy of  this period. If  he  is right, one would predict that, at the first 
whiff  of  recession and inflation, the popularity of Republicans would revert 
the mean. 
The major new research in the paper is the data on party identification by 
income sextile. This is an important approach, as we clearly need to go to 
panel data to resolve some of the unanswered questions about political behav- 
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ior. Among the important questions that cannot be resolved in aggregate data 
are distributional issues such as, Does aggregate or individual or perhaps class 
fortune determine individual voting behavior? The panel data should help us 
sort out these kinds of questions. 
I will not repeat the major results of  this path-breaking study, Rather, as 
befits a discussant, I will carp on a few points that need more attention, partic- 
ularly some areas of specification and statistical methodology. Among the is- 
sues that arise are the following. 
The classification is pretty clearly not independent of the state of the econ- 
omy.  Whether you are in the bottom sextile may well depend upon whether 
you have been thrown out of work, although this lottery probably does not 
apply to the top brackets. This will make bottom sextile particularly sensitive 
to unemployment or bad economic states and may bias the unemployment rate 
coefficients. 
To  illustrate, some of the people in the bottom sextile will be people who in 
the prior period were in the fifth sextile and subsequently lost their job and 
were thrown into the bottom. We  know that people hold the government re- 
sponsible for economic events (the so-called responsibility hypothesis), which 
suggests they will become displeased with the government. This will tend to 
raise the coefficients on unemployment in the bottom sextiles and lower them 
in the top sextiles. 
Even though the sample size appears respectable, breaking it down so finely 
may introduce significant sampling error in individual cells. For example, say 
we have a sample size of  1,800 broken into 6 income sextiles, which are then 
broken into 6 political groups, which yields a total of 50 persons in each of 
the 36 cells. Because the unemployment rate is a small number, the actual 
sampling error of unemployment will be very large from period to period for 
short unemployment spells. 
For example, for a sample of 50 workers with an average unemployment 
rate of  5 percent, I ran a Monte Car10 for the unemployment of the sample. 
Observations for a representative sample were [4, 2, 7, 1, 3, 0, 1, 2, 2, 2, 1, 
3, 3, 3, 4, 6, 51. The standard deviation of  this run is 1.82; the theoretical 
standard deviation for this binomial distribution is 1.54; the standard devia- 
tion of the aggregate annual unemployment rate for the postwar period is 1.2 
percentage points. This suggests that the estimated coefficients may be domi- 
nated by sampling error. 
The lag structure was highly surprising. The movement in party ID was 
labeled “glacial,” by which I presume we mean that there are large elements 
of habitat and persistence and that the lags of  party Republican to shocks 
would be quite long. For example, we might suppose that the events of  the 
Great Depression cast a long shadow over party alliliations; if so, the response 
of ID to the Depression would have a large lag term.  If we thought that half 
of the group who became Democrats because of the Great Depression left the 
party after 20 years, the lag coefficient would be .85 per two-year period. Or 40  Morris P.  Fiorina 
in the extreme, if  the change in party ID responds to various shocks, the lag 
coefficient would be one. 
In fact, the lags are short or nonexistent. It is  as if  there is in  effect no 
memory to the system. Given the firm belief that party affiliation is indeed 
very persistent, these results suggest that the data have a high degree of short- 
run white noise that swamps the lower level of  low-frequency, red  noise of 
persistence in party ID. 
In the end, this effort does not succeed very well in extracting much infor- 
mation about trends in party ID. Perhaps an alternative specification would 
improve the results. One approach would be to pool the data and fit fewer 
coefficients. Another possibility is to track the median party ID in an income 
class, which probably would give sharper results. 
Overall, issues of party affiliation and of the influence of economic events 
on political affiliation are an area that clearly calls for true panel data, where 
the experience of individuals can be tracked over time. From a research per- 
spective, the NBER should collaborate with other organizations in promoting 
the collection of such true panel data. 
We  have learned a great deal from this paper. With further work on  the 
statistical specification, and with the use of  true panel data, we could learn 
even more. 